LATEST JUDICIAL CASES
1.
PURUSHOTTAM
DAS BANGUR AND ORS. VS. DAYANAND GUPTA - OCT 31 2012
Issue
Transfer of Property
Act, 1882 - Sections 106, 108; West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 -
Sections 13, 13(1), 13(6); Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1950 - Section 13(1); Uttar Pradesh Cantonment Rent Control Act, 1952 -
Section 14; East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 - Section 13(2);
Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 - Section 11(4) (Supreme
Court)
Synopsis
An appeal was filed
against the judgment passed by the High Court of Calcutta whereby Civil First
Appeal filed by the Respondent-tenant was allowed, the judgment and decree
passed by the trial Court set aside and the suit for eviction filed by the
Plaintiff-Appellant against the Defendant-Respondent was dismissed. Whether the
alterations which the Respondent-tenant was found by the Courts below to have
made equivalent to erection of a "permanent structure" within the
meaning of Clause (p) of Section 108 of the Act. Held, the structure was not a
temporary structure and the alteration made by the tenant fell within the
mischief of Section 108(p) of the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore,
constituted a ground for his eviction in terms of Section 13(1) (b) of the West
Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. It was thus immaterial whether the structure
had resulted in creating additional usable space for the tenant who carried out
such alteration and additions. If addition of usable space was ever intended to
be an essential requirement under Section 108(p) of the Act, the Parliament
could have easily provided so. Nothing of this sort was done in Section 13(1)
(b) of the State Act, which clearly showed that addition of space was not the
test for determining whether the structure was permanent or temporary. Cases
referred to were: Brijendra Nath Bhargava and Anr. v. Harsh Wardhan and Ors, Om
Prakash v. Amar Singh and Ors., Waryam Singh v. Baldev Singh.
Hence, appeal was
allowed and the order passed by the High Court was set aside and that of the
trial Court was restored.
2.
Subulaxmi
Vs. M.D., Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation and Anr. - Nov 1 2012
Issue
Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 - Sections 166, 171 (Supreme Court)
Synopsis
Appellant as
claimant filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal claiming Rs. 6, 50,000/- as
compensation for the injuries sustained by her in a motor vehicle accident.
High Court rejected the appeal filed by Respondent No. 1 and allowed the
cross-objection in part. Being dissatisfied, the claimant had preferred the
present appeal for enhancement of the amount of compensation. Whether, the High
Court was justified in awarding compensation on a singular head relating to
permanent disability and loss of future earnings. Held, if the victim of an
accident suffered permanent or temporary disability, then efforts should always
be made to award sufficient compensation not only for the physical injury and
treatment, but also for the pain, suffering and trauma caused due to accident,
loss of earnings and victim's inability to lead a normal life and enjoy
amenities, which she would have enjoyed but for the disability caused due to
the accident. Thus, the view expressed by the High Court on this score was not
sustainable. As far as the pain and suffering and loss of amenities were
concerned, the grant of sum of Rs. 1, 00,000/ was appropriate. In case of
medical expenses, extra nourishment, transport charges and loss of earning
during treatment, the amount awarded by the High Court was allowed to remain as
such. Thus, the amount on the aforesaid scores would come to Rs. 45,000/-.
Regarding future replacement of artificial limbs and other medical expenses
were concerned, the enhancement to Rs. 1, 25,000/- was appropriate. The High
Court had declined to award interest on the enhanced sum. Section 171 of the
Act dealt with award of interest which stated that, where any Claims Tribunal
allowed a claim for compensation made under this Act, such Tribunal might
direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest should
also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of
making the claim as it may specify in this behalf. Thus, the High Court had
made a mistake in not granting interest on the increased sum and the interest awarded
by the tribunal was just and proper therefore should carry interest at the rate
9% per annum. Cases referred to were: Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General,
Geological Survey of India and Anr., Sarla Verma v. D.T.C.
Hence, appeal was
allowed.
3.
Thakker
Shipping P. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Customs (General) - Oct 30 2012
Issue
Customs Act, 1962 -
Sections 108, 129, 129A, 129A(1), 129A(2), 129A(3), 129A(4), 129A(5), 129A(6),
129A(7), 129A(1B), 129(B), 129D, 129D(1), 129D(2), 129D(3), 129D(4); Central
Excise Act, 1944 - Sections 35, 35B, 35C, 35EE, 35G, 35H, 35H(1); Limitation Act,
1963 - Sections 5, 29(2); Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to
Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 - Section 4(2); Custom House Agent
Licencing Regulations, 2004 - Regulation 23 (Supreme Court)
Synopsis
A ship was found to
contain assorted electrical and electronic goods of foreign origin. The
clearance of the goods was handled by M/s Thakker Shipping P. Ltd. Appellant,
referred to as the Custom House Agent. The Commissioner made an application
under Section 129D (4) of the Act before the Tribunal. As the said application
could not be made within the prescribed period and was delayed by 10 days, an
application for condonation of delay was filed with a prayer for condonation.
The Tribunal rejected the application for condonation of delay and consequently
dismissed the appeal. Hence, the present appeal. Whether it was competent for
the Tribunal to invoke Section 129A(5) of the Act where an application under
Section 129D(4) had not been made by the Commissioner within the prescribed
time and condone the delay in making such application if it was satisfied that
there was adequate cause for not presenting it within that period. Held, in
Fairgrowth Investments Ltd., the question raised before this Court was whether
the Special Court constituted under the Special Court (Trial of Offences
Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 had power to condone the
delay in filing a petition under Section 4(2) of the Act. Dealing with the said
question, the Court considered various provisions of the Limitation Act, including
Sections 5 and 29(2), and ultimately it was held that the provisions of the
Limitation Act had no application in relation to a petition under Section 4(2)
of the 1992 Act and the prescribed period was not capable of being extended by
the Court. Considering the judgments passed by the Court, it was held that it
was competent for the Tribunal to invoke Section 129A (5) where an application
under Section 129D (4) had not been made within the prescribed time and condone
the delay in making such application if it was satisfied that there was
sufficient cause for not presenting it within that period. Cases referred to
were: CCEx. Mumbai v. Azo Dye Chem, Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise
v. Hongo India Pvt. Limited and Anr., General Mills Company Limited v. State of
Rajasthan and Ors.
Hence, the appeal
failed and it was dismissed.
4.
Veena
Kalra Vs. Union of India & Anr. - Oct 31 2012
Issue
Companies Act, 1956
- Sections 10FD, 10E(2A), 642; Company Law Board (Qualifications, Experience
and Other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 1993 (Delhi High Court)
Synopsis
A writ petition was
filed in public interest seeking a direction to the Respondents to make
necessary and suitable amendments / modifications implementing the Guidelines
laid down by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. R. Gandhi, President,
Madras Bar with respect to selection and appointment to the post of Member
(Technical) in Company Law Board (CLB). A writ of quo warranto for quashing the
appointment of Respondent No.5 as Member (Technical) of the CLB in pursuance to
the Office as being contrary to the Guidelines was also sought. Whether, the
selection and appointment of the respondent No.5 as Member (Technical) of the
CLB in contravention of the Guidelines laid down in the judgment was liable to
be quashed. Held, present petition was a petition filed in public interest
seeking a writ of quo warranto i.e. of recalling the appointment of the
respondent No.5 to the post of Member (Technical) of CLB. The Supreme Court in
Dr. Duryodhan Sahu vs. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and in B. Srinivasa Reddy vs.
Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees Association had held
Public Interest Litigations to be not maintainable in service matters. However,
in N. Kannadasan Vs. Ajoy Khose the Supreme Court had made out an exception and
held that an appointment to a public office may be challenged in public
interest even where the Petitioner did not claim any right of appointment in
himself; however the same could be done by showing violation of public office
by a person not qualified to occupy the same or having been appointed without
following the procedure prescribed in law. A writ of quo warranto did not lie
if the alleged violation was not of a statutory provision. Writ of quo warranto
in the present case was sought by contending the Respondent No.5 to be not qualified.
However, once the Respondent No.5 was qualified in terms of the Rules framed
for the said purpose, no writ of quo warranto could be issued and particularly
when there was no challenge even to the said Rules. The question, as to whether
what had been held by the Supreme Court in relation to the qualifications of
the Members of NCLT and NCLAT, applied to the Members of CLB, could be decided
only by challenging the Rules providing for the qualification of the Members of
the CLB.
Hence, the present petition
was dismissed.
5.
Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. "Maryada", The Weekly News Magazine
& Ors. - Oct 31 2012
Issue
Civil Procedure Code
- Order 39 Rules 1, 2 (Delhi High Court)
Synopsis
The Plaintiff was a
Government of India Undertaking engaged in exploration and production of
Natural gas and oil in the country. Defendant No.2 published a magazine from
Uran in District Raigad of Maharashtra. Defendant No. 3 claimed to be a social
worker, whereas Defendant No. 4 printed the magazine 'Maryada'. Defendant No. 3
wrote certain articles in various issues of Maryada, alleging corruption in the
project of ONGC at Uran. The case of the Plaintiff was that the Defendants had
defamed it by publishing such uncorroborated defamatory allegations, as a
result of which its reputation was seriously damaged. Whether a corporation
could sue for damages on account of defamation and if so, what was the scope of
its right in this regard? Whether the articles / letters written published by
the Defendants could be said to be defamatory to the Plaintiff Company. Held,
none of the allegations contained in the articles published and the letters
sent by the Defendants could be said to be defamatory to the Plaintiff as a
Corporation, though it could hardly be disputed that they were defamatory to
the officers, named therein, in case they were untrue. No one on reading all
those articles and letters would consider ONGC, as a Company to be indulging in
corruption. The defamation of the officers of a corporation, did not, per se,
amount to defamation of the corporation itself. Dishonesty by a Corporation was
altogether different from dishonesty by its officers. If a person said that a
Company was indulging in corrupt or dishonest practices with the Government
Agencies, its business associates, its shareholders or its employees that would
be defamatory to the Company. But, if it was said that its officers/directors
were indulging in such practices, qua the Company itself, that would not be a
defamation of the Company. Since the articles published and the letters written
by the Defendants could not be said to be defamatory to the plaintiff-company,
it had no legal right to seek damages from the Defendants. The officers of ONGC
named in the articles and letters had not even joined as Co-Plaintiffs. The
suit, therefore, was liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. Cases
referred to were: Indian Express Newspapers (Bom.) Pvt. Ltd. V. Jagmohan,
Metroplitan Saloom Ombinus Co. Ltd. v. Hawkins.
Hence, suit was
dismissed.
Source:- Think Legal
With Regards
Prakash Verma
E. ID:
Prkverma@gmail.com
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